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WHO OWNS THE MOON, MARS, AND OTHER
CELESTIAL BODIES: LUNAR JURISPRUDENCE IN
CORPUS JURIS SPATIALIS
DENNISON A. BUTLER*
ON JULY 20TH, 1969, the United States not only solidifiedits dominance in the space race against its ideological ri-
val,1 but also captured the hearts and minds of the entire world
with the immortal words of Neil Armstrong, “That’s one small
step for man . . . one giant leap for mankind.”2 However, the
real question has become whether the United States owns the
Moon because it landed there first—first in time, first in right?
Can the United States claim it under John Locke’s labor theory,3
having merely planted a flag there? Are the Moon and Mars to
be used equally by all countries, and how will that work in future
years? Can countries or individuals even claim property rights
on celestial bodies? And, finally, how can property rights on the
Moon and Mars impact space exploration?
With a few words, Neil Armstrong immortalized centuries of
people gazing longingly at the Moon and wondering what the
human race would find beyond Earth’s atmosphere. Johannes
Kepler predicted in 1610 that “[a]s soon as somebody demon-
strates the art of flying, settlers from our species of man will not
* Dennison A. Butler is a Staff Attorney with the State of Montana. He has
extensive experience in real estate law including oil and gas work, title issues,
commercial leasing, agriculture and grazing rights, and property transfers within
Montana as well as internationally in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Japan, and Vietnam.
1 Apollo Anniversary: Moon Landing “Inspired World”, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, http://
news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/07/0714_040714_moonlanding.html
(last visited Sept. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/2S96-D6BL].
2 DAVID M. HARLAND, EXPLORING THE MOON: THE APOLLO EXPEDITIONS 27 (2d
ed. 2008).
3 JOHN LOCKE, LOCKE’S TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 283–446 (Peter Laslett
ed., 2d ed. 1967).
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be lacking [on the Moon and Jupiter].”4 Jules Verne went on to
say that “[i]n spite of the opinions of certain narrow-minded
people, who would shut up the human race upon this globe, . . .
we shall one day travel to the Moon, the planets, and the stars
with the same facility, rapidity and certainty as we now make the
voyage from Liverpool to New York!”5 Although the race to the
Moon was originally commenced to establish superiority be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union,6 the resulting
technological advances are still evident in our daily lives—from
the mundane to the saving of human lives.7 Despite the obvious
reasons in favor of establishing a presence on the Moon and
Mars, the necessity for it in the future, and the United States’
position of influence in the world today, existing treaties, in
their current state, severely limit what can be accomplished and
have effectively hampered technological advances that should
have already been made. The potential harm caused by these
treaties will be the focus of this article. Specifically, this article
will discuss: (1) the current treaties and laws regarding property
rights on the Moon and Mars; (2) the problems with the current
laws; and (3) what the law should look like in order to promote
lunar and spacial exploration in the future.
I. TREATIES AND LAWS REGARDING PROPERTY ON
CELESTIAL BODIES
The 1959 United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS),8 precipitated the adoption of the 1963
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.9 COPUOS then es-
tablished broad, guiding principles in the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
4 Letter from Johannes Kepler to Galileo Galilei, “Conversation with the Mes-
senger from the Stars,” (Apr. 19, 1610); 1 JOHN WILKINS, A DISCOURSE CONCERN-
ING A NEW WORLD AND ANOTHER PLANET: IN 2 BOOKES (sic) (1640).
5 JULES VERNE, FROM THE EARTH TO THE MOON 49 (1865).
6 See generally CHARLES MURRAY & CATHERINE BLY COX, APOLLO: THE RACE TO
THE MOON (1989); see generally JOHN M. LOGSDON, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE RACE
TO THE MOON (2010); see generally JIM OTTAVIANI ET AL., T-MINUS: THE RACE TO
THE MOON (2009).
7 See NASA Spinoff Database, NASA: MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, TECHNOL-
OGY TRANSFER OFFICE, https://spinoff.nasa.gov/spinoff/database/?c=msfc (last
visited Sept. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/YX2A-S6RR].
8 See G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), at 1 (Dec. 12, 1959).
9 See G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII) (Dec. 13, 1963).
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(Outer Space Treaty).10 The Outer Space Treaty led to four sub-
sequent agreements:
(1) the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Re-
turn of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched
into Outer Space;11
(2) the 1975 Convention on the Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space;12
(3) the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Dam-
age Caused by Space Objects;13 and
(4) the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon
Agreement).14
The pertinent agreements dealing with property rights are
the Outer Space Treaty15 and the Moon Agreement.16 Although
the COPUOS remains in existence, there is still no method in
place for countries or individuals to gain property rights to the
Moon or Mars.17 Instead, property on the Moon is regarded as a
“common heritage” for all mankind.18
The Outer Space Treaty set the foundation for subsequent
treaties.19 In connection with property interests, Articles I and II
state that “the [M]oon and other celestial bodies . . . shall be the
province of all mankind,”20 and that “[o]uter space, including
the [M]oon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occu-
10 G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI) (Dec. 19, 1966) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
11 Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119.
12 Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.
13 Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187.
14 Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
15 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. I–XI.
16 See generally Moon Agreement, supra note 14. The Moon Agreement has
been ratified by Austria, Australia, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philip-
pines, Uruguay, France, Guatemala, India, Morocco, Peru, and Romania. The
Moon Agreement has not been ratified by Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Rus-
sia, the United Kingdom, or the United States.
17 Kurt Anderson Baca, Property Rights in Outer Space, 58 J AIR L. & COM. 1041,
1069 (1993).
18 Id. at 1060–69; see also Moon Agreement, supra note 14; Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 10.
19 Scott F. Cooper, The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies: Does it Create a Moratorium on the Commercial Exploitation of the
Moon’s Natural Resources?, 5 J.L. & TECH. 63, 64 (1990).
20 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. I. It further states that parties to the
Outer Space Treaty are prohibited from placing weapons of mass destruction in
orbit or on celestial bodies. Id. art. IV.
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pation, or by any other means.”21 This effectively bars national
appropriation of property on the Moon and Mars, allowing free
access of any country to those resources subject to international
law and the U.N. Charter. Although the United States signed
the Outer Space Treaty, they have not signed any of the subse-
quent treaties that have extended and reinforced limits on
countries’ ability to appropriate or claim property on the Moon
and Mars.22 In fact, limitations on countries’ ability to appropri-
ate property on the Moon was one of the main reasons that the
United States, as well as Japan, Russia, and most major devel-
oped states, have not ratified the Moon Agreement.23
The Moon Agreement was intended to supplement the Outer
Space Treaty, and, thus, the Moon Agreement controls when it
contains more specific provisions than the Outer Space Treaty.24
The Moon Agreement was open for signatures in the late 1970s
and became effective in 1984.25 It then further codified the
rights of individual countries concerning the Moon through
treaty.26 The Moon Agreement reiterated the propositions ex-
pressed in the Outer Space Treaty by stating that “[t]he moon is
not subject to national appropriation by any claim of sover-
eignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”27
It also states that “[t]he moon and its natural resources are the
common heritage of mankind.”28 Not only does the Moon
Agreement prohibit national appropriation, it also requires “eq-
uitable sharing” of benefits derived from the Moon or space by
all states that are a party to the agreement.29 Equitable sharing
accounts for “the interests and needs of developing countries, as
well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed ei-
ther directly or indirectly to the exploration of the Moon.30 To
date, the United States, Russia, and other advanced nations have
not become parties to the Moon Agreement, in large part be-
cause of the disagreement over the common heritage concept in
21 Id. art. XI.
22 See Moon Agreement, supra note 14.
23 Sara Bruhns & Jacob Haqq-Misra, A Pragmatic Approach to Sovereignty on Mars,
38 SPACE POL’Y 57, 59 (2016).
24 H.A. Wassenbergh, Speculations on the Law Governing Space Resources, 5 ANNALS
AIR & SPACE L. 617 (1980).
25 Cooper, supra note 19, at 77; Moon Agreement, supra note 14.
26 Cooper, supra note 19, at 64.
27 Moon Agreement, supra note 14, art. 11(2).
28 Id. art. 11(1).
29 Id. art. 11(7)(d).
30 Id.
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Article 11.31 In addition to countries, the Moon Agreement also
prohibits private companies from laying claim to property on
the Moon.32 It is the first treaty to recognize that not only gov-
ernments, but also private companies may soon have the ability
and incentive to explore the Moon.33
II. INHERENT PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT
TREATIES AND LAWS
People have mistakenly argued that the Moon should be gov-
erned by res communis, or a common ownership to all mankind.34
This legal doctrine has been used in the past for other re-
sources, “like airspace, the deep sea-bed, solar energy, and radio
spectra.”35 The fallacy of broad application of this principle to
the Moon, Mars, and other celestial bodies is that the principle
of res communis generally applies to resources that are either nec-
essary for survival (like fishing) or are of such a nature as to
make private ownership impossible.36 A classic example of the
impossibility of private ownership is an area in the middle of a
lake. In that situation, it is not feasible to establish property lines
extending into the middle of a lake. Furthermore, holding land
available for all mankind eliminates any incentive for govern-
ments or private individuals to improve the land. Aristotle once
stated, “[w]hat is common to many is taken least care of, for all
men have greater regard for what is their own than for what they
possess in common with others.”37
By saying everyone in a community owns something, one may
indirectly infer that no one truly has ownership of it, and there-
fore, no one in the community has any interest in maximizing
its potential. Property rights have traditionally been analogized
31 KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 4, 166–75 (1998). Common heritage of mankind is a “legal
principle of international law” which states that certain territory is held in a trust
for future generations, and is not to be exploited or appropriated for individual
nations. Id. at 4.
32 See Moon Agreement, supra note 14, art. 11.
33 See id.
34 See G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII) (Dec. 13, 1958).
35 David Tan, Towards a New Regime for the Protection of Outer Space as the “Province
for All Mankind”, 25 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 145, 161 (2000).
36 Compare GYULA GAL, SPACE LAW 189–90 (1969), with G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV)
(Dec. 12, 1970).
37 James D. Gwartney & Richard L. Stroup, Communal vs. Private Property Rights,
FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Feb. 1, 1988) (quoting Aristotle).
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to a bundle of sticks.38 The bundle of sticks analogy generally
denotes five specific rights available to property holders:
(1) Access: The right to enter a defined physical area and en-
joy nonsubstractive benefits (for example, hike, canoe, or
sit in the sun);
(2) Withdrawal: The right to obtain resource units or prod-
ucts of a resource system (for example, catch fish or di-
vert water);
(3) Management: The right to regulate internal use patterns
and transform the resource by making improvements;
(4) Exclusion: The right to determine who will have access
rights and withdrawal rights, and how those rights may be
transferred; and
(5) Alienation: The right to sell or lease management and ex-
clusion rights.39
By leaving only a right of access to the Moon and Mars, the
United Nations has stripped away the most important rights,
thereby ensuring that the celestial bodies will not be exploited
and their resources will be preserved and protected. In essence,
the treaties recognize that the current generation must be pre-
vented from exploiting or depleting celestial bodies in hopes of
protecting them for future generations. The countries unable to
properly claim and maintain property claims on celestial bodies
have effectively restricted the ability of any country to use the
Moon’s resources. However, similar to other issues before the
United Nations, treaties concerning the Moon and Mars face a
collective action problem. Due to the amount of competing
views and interests between the different countries, nothing sub-
stantial will ever be agreed upon in regard to exploring and us-
ing the resources that are there.40
The majority of states seeking to impose restrictions on coun-
tries with space programs have no means of utilizing these re-
sources themselves. These treaties have therefore allowed states
that lack the means to develop the resources the ability to re-
strict states that possess this ability.
38 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982).
39 ELINOR OSTROM & CHARLOTTE HESS, PRIVATE AND COMMON PROPERTY RIGHTS
11 (2007); see Seawall Assoc. v. City of New York, 74 N.Y.2d 92, 104 (1989) (hold-
ing that the right to develop property is an important “stick” in the property
rights bundle); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); Loretto,
458 U.S. at 433.
40 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965).
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Furthermore, the states that do not possess the means of ap-
propriating property on the Moon or Mars are not losing prop-
erty rights; a state cannot lose land that it never held title to.
III. WHAT THE LAW SHOULD LOOK LIKE TO PROMOTE
FUTURE EXPLORATION
Throughout the years, a number of property theories have
been proposed to explain the rights on celestial bodies, apart
from the inherent flaw that everyone owns them collectively.41
One of the first theories regarding property rights in outer
space is an extension of the doctrine of cuius est solum ejus est
usque ad coelum (“he who owns the land, owns it to the skies”).42
The obvious problem with this idea when extended to celestial
bodies is that Earth moves. However, some smaller countries
have used this theory to contest that smaller countries should
have the same rights as larger, more developed countries. They
argue that as one projects property rights upward into infinite
space, like a cone above the earth, eventually all countries will
have the same claims over everything in outer space.43 Others
have recognized the problem with this theory and simply de-
clare that the doctrine of ad coelum “has no place in the modern
world.”44 Some have tried to harmonize the idea of ad coelum by
establishing altitudinal boundaries that would establish coun-
tries’ ownership over their airspace within Earth’s atmosphere
while allowing another set of laws to govern outer space.45
Within this theory, the question then becomes how to deter-
mine where Earth’s atmosphere ends and outer space begins.46
Some have suggested arbitrary limits expanding a couple of
miles outward from each country’s borders,47 akin to countries’
41 See Moon Agreement, supra note 14, art. 11.
42 Joe C. Savage, Legal Control of Outer Space, 52 KY. L.J. 404, 409 (1964).
43 Franco Fiorio, Space Law—Point of View of a Small Country, in Interna-
tional Astronautical Federation, Proceedings of the Fourth Colloquium on the
Law of Outer Space 111 (1963).
44 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
45 Hal H. Bookout, Conflicting Sovereignty Interests in Outer Space: Proposed Solu-
tions Remain in Orbit!, 7 MIL. L. REV. 23, 35 (1960).
46 ARTHUR C. CLARKE, THE MAKING OF A MOON 51 (rev. ed. 1958) (observing
that it is no more possible to establish “where the atmosphere ends than one can
define the moment when a musical note ceases”).
47 Limits ranging from 30 to 50,000 miles have been proposed. See, e.g., Rich-
ard T. Murphy, Jr., Air Sovereignty Considerations in Terms of Outer Space, 19 ALA.
LAW. 11, 33 (Jan. 1958) (proposing 30 miles); C.L. Sulzberger, Brush-Fire Peace—
V: An Attainable Goal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1960, at 20 (proposing fifty miles);
Charles Herzfeld, For U.S. Control of Outer Space, NEW LEADER 9 (1957) (proposing
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ownership of the oceans just off their coasts.48 Others have pro-
posed, with varying degrees of success, more technical limits like
the “point of nullity of the field of gravity,”49 or the maximum
altitude at which aerodynamic lift is available.50 A different the-
ory, the law of conquest, has been advanced with very limited
application. The law of conquest was extremely influential in
shaping the United States during the expansion period of 1845
to 1860.51 However, it has diminished in value since the creation
of the United Nations in 1945.52 Conquest is “the taking of pos-
session of territory of an enemy by force, and a transfer of sover-
eignty occurs only if the conquered territory is effectively
reduced to possession and annexed by the conquering state.”53
This form of property acquisition has been repeatedly affirmed
by the U.S. courts.54 That being said, applying this theory to the
acquisition of lunar property rights presupposes that someone
controlled that property to begin with, which is problematic.
Therefore, unless the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration (NASA) has not yet released some very important infor-
mation about the Moon to the public, this theory would not
allow the United States to assert ownership of lunar property
rights.
However, the doctrine of res nullius could apply. Res nullius, or
terra nullius, is an international law principle used to describe
land or territory that has not yet been subject to the sovereignty
of any state or for which a prior sovereignty has relinquished
sovereignty over the area.55 Australia was claimed by the British
settlement in Cooper v. Stuart56 under the doctrine of terra nullius.
Other areas claimed under terra nullius include the Western Sa-
100 miles); National Sovereignty of Outer Space, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1172 (1961)
(proposing 50,000 miles).
48 G.A. Res. 48/263, at 1 (July 28, 1994).
49 ALVARO BAUZA ARAUJO, HACIA UN DERECHO ASTRONAUTICO 125 (1957).
50 ANDREW G. HALEY, SURVEY OF LEGAL OPINION ON EXTRATERRESTRIAL JURISDIC-
TION 26, 37, 40 (1960).
51 PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST
OF THE AMERICAN WEST 27–28 (1st ed. 1987).
52 STANLEY MESLER, UNITED NATIONS: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS (1st ed. 1995).
53 ERIC C. SURETTE, 48 C.J.S. INTERNATIONAL LAW § 17 (2017).
54 See, e.g., United States v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. 414, 434 (1872); United States v.
Fullard-Leo, 133 F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1943); Republic Av. Corp. v. Lowe, 69 F.
Supp. 472, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff’g, 164 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1947).
55 MICHAEL CONNOR, THE INVENTION OF TERRA NULLIUS: HISTORICAL AND LE-
GAL FICTIONS ON THE FOUNDATION OF AUSTRALIA (2005).
56 14 App. Cas. 286 (1889).
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hara,57 Svalbard,58 Greenland,59 Antarctica,60 Scarborough
Shoal,61 New Zealand,62 and Guano Islands.63
The doctrine of discovery is another theory implicated regard-
ing property rights on celestial bodies and terra nullis. The doc-
trine of discovery is an international law principle under which
European countries, colonists, and settlers made legal claims
against the lands of indigenous peoples all over the world from
the fifteenth through the twentieth century.64 Even today, the
doctrine of discovery is applied in New Zealand,65 Canada,66 and
Australia.67 Examples also include China, which invoked this
doctrine in 2010 when it planted its flag to claim sovereignty
57 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (Oct. 16).
58 RUPERT W. ANDERSON, THE COSMIC COMPENDIUM: SPACE LAW 65 (2015)
(“Svalbard was considered to be a terra nullius until Norway was given sovereignty
over the islands in the Svalbard Treaty of 9 February 1920.”).
59 Id. at 66 (“Norway occupied and claimed parts of (then uninhabited) East-
ern Greenland in the 1920s, claiming that it constituted terra nullius. The matter
was decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice against Norway.”).
60 Id. (Antarctica “was not sighted by humans until . . . 1820.”).
61 Id. (“The Philippines and the People’s Republic of China both claim the
Scarborough Shoal or Panatag Shoal or Huangyan Island ( ), nearest to the
island of Luzon, located in the South China Sea. The Philippines claims it under
the principles of terra nullius and EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). China’s
claim refers to its discovery in the 13th century by Chinese fishermen.”).
62 Id. (“In 1840, Lieutenant William Hobson, following instructions of the Brit-
ish government, pronounced the southern island of New Zealand to be uninhab-
ited by civilized peoples, which qualified the land to be ‘terra nullius,’ and
therefore fit for the Crown’s political occupation.”).
63 Id. (“The Guano Islands Act from August 18, 1856, enabled citizens of the
U.S. to take possession of islands containing guano deposits. The islands can be
located anywhere, so long as they are not occupied and not within the jurisdic-
tion of other governments. It also empowers the President of the United States to
use the military to protect such interests, and establishes the criminal jurisdiction
of the United States.”).
64 ROBERT J. MILLER ET AL., DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS: THE DOCTRINE OF
DISCOVERY IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES 2 (2010); see ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE
AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEWIS & CLARK, AND
MANIFEST DESTINY 9 (2006); Robert J. Miller & Jacinta Ruru, An Indigenous Lens
into Comparative Law: The Doctrine of Discovery in the United States and New Zealand,
111 W. VA. L. REV. 849, 852–56 (2009); Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in
American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 8–21 (2005).
65 Ngati Apa v. Attorney-General [2003] NZCA 117, [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA);
Te Runanganui O Te Ika Whenua Inc. Soc’y. v. Attorney-General [1993] NZCA
218, [1994] 2 NZLR 20 (CA).
66 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.); Guerin v.
The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (Can.).
67 Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.).
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over the bed of the South China Sea.68 In 2007, Russia also used
this doctrine when it laid claim to the Arctic Ocean seabed.69
Similarly, Canada and Denmark each claimed sovereignty over
an island off the west coast of Greenland in 2005.70 In fact, the
Supreme Court of the United States of America cited the doc-
trine of discovery as a basis for property ownership as recently as
2005.71 Traditionally, discovery created an:
inchoate title to a territory that must be perfected by its effective
occupation. . . . To turn a first discovery into a complete title, a
European country had to actually occupy and possess the newly
found lands. This was usually done by building forts or settle-
ments. This physical possession had to be accomplished within a
reasonable amount of time after the first discovery to create a
complete title.72
For an interesting case study, the Scarborough Shoal was
claimed by China under the principles of discovery in the thir-
teenth century, whereas the Philippines claimed the Shoal
under the theory of terra nullius.73
Furthermore, the international doctrine of discovery is consis-
tent with John Locke’s labor theory of property. Locke’s theory
famously posits that before government existed, all men had
common access to Earth’s resources as given by God.74 In order
to survive, individuals had to appropriate resources for them-
selves.75 Through their own labor and effort, men were able to
gain private property rights if they did not waste the resources
they claimed.76
68 William J. Broad, China Explores a Rich Frontier Two Miles Deep, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/science/12deepsea.
html [https://perma.cc/NRJ2-4QSQ].
69 Robert J. Miller, Finders Keepers in the Arctic?, L.A. Times (Aug. 6, 2007),
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/aug/06/news/OE-MILLER6 [https://
perma.cc/KR9H-FW5M].
70 Canada Island Visit Angers Danes, BBC NEWS, July 25, 2005, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4715245.stm [https://perma.cc/2UVW-MJ5D].
71 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 203 n. 1
(2005); see also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 570 (1823).
72 Robert J. Miller et al., The International Law of Discovery, Indigenous Peoples,
and Chile, 89 NEB. L. REV. 819, 821–25 (2010); see also JOHN DUGARD, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 132 (3d ed. 2005); IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 139–40 (6th ed. 2003).
73 ANDERSON, supra note 59.
74 LOCKE, supra note 3, at 283–446.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 305–06.
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The labor of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say are
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that
nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labor with,
and joyned [sic] to it something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his property. It being by him removed from the com-
mon state nature placed it in, it hath by his labor something an-
nexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men . . . at
least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for
others.77
The United States prides itself in and was established under
the idea that “all men are created equal.”78 The spirit of entre-
preneurship has not only had an influence on America’s eco-
nomic system but has also directly impacted every aspect of our
lives.79 Adam Smith declared, “[l]ittle else is requisite to carry a
state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barba-
rism but peace, easy taxes and a tolerable administration of jus-
tice.”80 To justify his position he went on to say:
As every individual . . . endeavours [sic] . . . to employ his capital
in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry
that its produce may be of the greatest value, every individual
necessarily labours [sic] to render the annual revenue of the soci-
ety as great as he can . . . . [While] he intends only his own gain
. . . he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand
to promote an end which was no part of his intention.81
The ability to profit through ones own work has been one of
the leading contributors to economic wealth not only in the
United States, but also in free trade zones such as Hong Kong.82
This allows individuals to profit from the work of their own la-
bor and to subsequently enjoy the benefits or suffer the losses
from those risks.83
77 Id.; see also MARTIN SELIGER, THE LIBERAL POLITICS OF JOHN LOCKE 180–88
(1969) (contrasting Locke’s view of original ownership with that of Grotius and
Pufendorf).
78 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, pmbl. (U.S. 1776).
79 See Peter Burnham, Capitalism, in THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
POLITICS (2d ed. 2003); see also Michael Mousseau, The Social Market Roots of Demo-
cratic Peace, 334 INT’L SECURITY 52, 53 (2009); but see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita &
George W. Downs, Development and Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2005); Joseph
T. Siegle et al., Why Democracies Excel, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 57 (2004).
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One of the best examples that can be analogized to territory
in space is the Homestead Act of 1862.84 President Abraham
Lincoln signed the bill into law, allowing individuals to acquire a
freehold title in fee simple to 160 acres of land if they: (1) filed
an application; (2) improved the land; and (3) filed for a
deed.85 This right was limited to individuals who were over
twenty-one years old or the head of a family and had lived on
the land for at least five years.86 Nonetheless, the Homestead Act
of 1862 gave individuals a chance to directly enjoy the fruits of
their labor. Allowing individuals to profit or suffer from their
own sweat is an exemplification John Locke’s labor theory.87
The Homestead Act of 1862 was also imitated, with some modifi-
cation, by Canada88 in 1872 and by several Australian colonies89
in the 1860s.
Allowing people the ability to profit or loss from their own
risk in working land directly allowed the settlement and cultiva-
tion of most of the land west of the Mississippi River. Between
1862 and 1938, “almost 1.5 million households were given title
to 246 million acres of land.”90 That area is approximately the
acreage of California and Texas combined.91 Some have esti-
mated that even today $46.3 billion is generated every year di-
rectly because of the industrious pioneers.92
84 Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976) [hereinafter Home-
stead Act of 1862].
85 The Homestead Act, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/education/
lessons/homestead-act [https://perma.cc/94Z8-KYQ3].
86 Homestead Act of 1862, supra note 88, §§ 2, 5.
87 See LOCKE, supra note 3; see generally ROBERT L. BRADLEY, JR., CAPITALISM AT
WORK: BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT AND ENERGY (2008).
88 KIRK N. LAMBRECHT, THE ADMINISTRATION OF DOMINION LANDS, 1870–1930
(1st ed. 1991) (The Dominion Lands Act encouraged the settlement of Canada’s
prairie provinces.).
89 STEPHEN H. ROBERTS, HISTORY OF AUSTRALIAN LAND SETTLEMENT, 1788–1920
(1924) (commonly referred to as Selection Acts).
90 Trina Williams, The Homestead Act: A Major Asset-Building Policy in Ameri-
can History 5 (Ctr. For Social Dev., Working Paper 00-9, 2000).
91 Id. at 6.
92 Deborah Groban Olson, Fair Exchange: Providing Citizens with Equity Managed
by a Community Trust, in Return for Government Subsidies or Tax Breaks to Business, 15
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 251 (2006). Todd Arrington, Historian at the
Homestead National Monument of America, ‘Economics and the Homestead
Act’ (2005), bases his calculation as follows:
All the states that had homesteading at some point in American
history have a modern combined gross state product of $4.63 tril-
lion. If we assume that just one percent of that modern total can be
related to homesteading (via agriculture, manufacturing, retail
sales, real estate, etc.), that means that the Homestead Act is still
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Structuring property ownership laws on the Moon, Mars, and
other celestial bodies after the Homestead Act of 1862 would
allow companies, individuals, and even countries to claim prop-
erty if they “improve[ ] the land”93 in some way. This would pre-
vent entities from claiming extraterrestrial property without
having first demonstrated a proper use for it.94 On top of that,
entities would have an incentive to profit from their own effort.
Like President Lincoln encouraging Americans to settle the
West, incentivizing entities to claim extraterrestrial property on
the Moon and Mars would accelerate space colonization and
promote utilization of resources already available.
The desire and profit is great for entities to explore the Moon
and outer space. However, the treaties that currently exist, for-
bidding country and private ownership, destroy any incentive to
use the resources found thereon. If the laws allowed people,
companies, or countries to claim ownership to what they could
manage, it would create significant incentive for both private
and government groups to invest the resources necessary to es-
tablish ownership and control over the property on Mars, the
Moon, and other celestial bodies.95 Furthermore, allowing enti-
ties to claim property rights over only what they can manage
would pave the way for everyone to profit as lunar exploration
and colonization become more feasible and affordable.
responsible for the generation of $46.3 billion every year. . . . Dollar
figures taken from the website of the United States Census Bureau.
1998 figures are the most recent available.
Id. at 251 n.63.
93 Homestead Act of 1862, supra note 88.
94 Compare id., with LOCKE, supra note 3.
95 Prime Lunar Real Estate for Sale—But Hurry, CNN (Nov. 20, 2000), http://
www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/space/11/20/lunar.land [https://perma.cc/HGV6-
U8Y8] (As of 2000, more than 300,000 people had purchased “lunar deeds”
through companies with no legitimate claims).
